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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
ED B. SHRIVER, et al,
Petitioners,
vs.
I. G. BENCH,
Provo City Recorder,
Respondent.

CASE
NO. 8678

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The statement of facts made by petitioners in their brief
is generally acceptable. However, we deem it helpful to
state more fully the salary and other changes the proposed
initiative ordinance would make. Also some additional
statements should be made concerning the adoption of the
"Council-Manager Charter" by the citizens of Provo.
The proposed ordinance seeks to amend Title 1-0-16(o)
Revised Ordinances of Provo City, 1949, as amended in 1954
and 1955. Section 1 amends 1-0-16(o) in the second para-
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graph thereof ·by substituting for the last three words of
same "board of commissioners" the ·words "Provo City Council.'' The pay range table of said section is unchanged, but
there is added thereto a proviso fixing minimum salaries
for the Provo Police Department and Provo Fire Department from the sixth grade up to the first and ranging from
$3,540.00 to $4,740.00. It further provides that after one
year's service the police or the .firemen move automatically
up to the next grade. Upon the ordinance taking effect,
without any examination the police or the fireman shall
start to receive "the annual salaries as their total number
of years with their respective department calls for." A
uniform allowance, in addition to salary, in the sum of $15.00
is provided for each offi·cer. The proposed ordinance further provides for a cost of living adjustment to the above
mentioned salaries. The salary is tied to the 1957 level of
the B.L.S. Consumer Price Index. As this index goes up,
so do the wages, at $2.00 per month. There is also a decrease provision, but it is not as liberal. There is a provision as to what happens in the event the B.L.S. Consumer
Price Index is discontinued.
At a special election held in August, 1955, the citizens
of Provo, pursuant to Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution of Utah, adopted the "Council-Manager Charter''
of Provo City, Utah, to become effective January 1, 1956,
hereinafter referred to as the Charter. Certified, authenticated copies thereof were thereafter duly filed in the respective offices of the Secretary of State and City Recorder.
Since January 1, 1956, its effective date, the Charter has
been in full force and effect, and it is required by the aforesaid constitutional provision that "all courts shall take judicial notice of such charter." For convenience of the Court
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we attach to this brief an official copy of the Charter so
that references thereto can be readily identified.
In our opinion, the issues to be determined by this ~court
in the ease at bar are as follows:
1. Under general Utah law, is the fixing of salaries
of municipal officers, including police and firemen, an adminisrative function not subject to the initiative law?

Under the provisions of the ~Charter, is the fixing
of salaries of municipal officers, including police and firemen, an adminisrative function not referable to the voters
2.

under the initiative law?
Does the proposed ordinance constitute an attempt
to attack the Charter collaterally in the matter orf fixing
salaries?
3.

We believe that the general law regarding the fixing
of salaries of municipal officers, including police and firemen, is an administrative matter, and when the Provo Charter provisions are added there can be no doubt about it.
In either event, the initiative law ean have no application.
In support of our position, we make the following points:
STATEMENT OF POINTS

POINT I
THE PEOPLE OF PR0'V0' HIAVE THE UNQUESTIONED RIGHT TO INV0KE THE POWERS O~F INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CONNECTION WITH
ACTS WHICH ARE LEGISLATIVE IN c·HARACTER,
BUT NOT AS TQ1 ACTS WHICH ARE ADMINISTRATIVE IN CHARACTER.
1

1
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POINT II
THE PROPOSED ORDINANCE WOUlD HAVE ·PROVO CITIZENS ACT TO RAISE PROVO POLICE AND
FIREMEN'S SALARIES AND SUCH ACTION IS ADMINISTRATIVE IN CHARACTER, AND CONSEQUENTLY THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM LAW IS
NOT APPLICABLE.
POINT ITI
IN ANY EVENT, THE PROVISIONS OF THE PROVO CITY CHARTER MAKE THE FIXING OF SALARIES
FOR MUNICIPAL OFFICERS, INCLUDING POLICE
AND FIREMEN, AD:MINISTRATIVE IN CHARACTER
AND SUCH ACTION IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM LAW.
POINT N
THE A'ITEMPT MADE BY THE PROPOSED ORDINANCE TO RAISE THE SALARIES OF THE POLICE
AND FIREMEN OF PROVO CITY, WITHOUT FffiST
COMPLYING WITH ARTICLE 7 OF THE PROVO CITY
CHARTER, CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK
U)PON THE CHARTER WinCH IS THE ORGANIC LAW
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PROVO CITY.
THE ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE PEOPLE OF PROVO 1MVE THE UNQUESTIONED RIGHT TO INVOKE THE POWERS OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CONNECTION WITH
ACTS WHICH ARE LEGISLATIVE IN CHARACTER,
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BUT NOT AS TO ACTS WHICH ARE ADMINISTRATIVE IN CHARACTER.
Our concern here is not so much the liberal -construction of the initiative and referendum law, as it is the applicability of the same to the case at bar. It has already been
construed by this Court as inapplicable to administrative
matters, as the petitioners very properly concede. It is
true that in Article 10, Section 1, of the Oharter, Provo
citizens ". . . reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum to be exercised in the manner prescribed by general law." The general Utah law referred
to in this Charter provision is embodied in Chapter 11, Title
20, U. C. A., 1953, which petitioners seek to invoke. Section
20-11-21 thereof provides as follows:
"Subject to the provisions of this chapter, legal
voters of any city or town, in such numbers as herein
required, may initiate any desired legislation and cause
the same to be submitted to the law-making body, or to
a vote of the people of such city or town for approval
or rejection, or may require any law or ordinance
passed by the law-making body of such city or town
to be submitted to the voters thereof before such law
or ordinance shall take effect."
In Keigley vs. Bench, 97 Utah 69, 89 P2d 482, 122 A.
L. R. 756, this section was held to be applicable only to such
laws, ordinances or motions that are legislative in character,
and does not apply to those adminisrative in character. The
provisions of the proposed ordinance in the Keigley case,
refunding bonds authorized by a previous ordinance, changing dates of the bonds, and the date of principal and interest payments, were held to be administrative in their
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nature and not subject to referendum, but the provisions
extending the plan of refunding from the fifteen year period
to a twenty year period was held to be legislative in its
nature and required submission to the electorate.
This Court, in the Keigley case, says at page 761 A.
L. R.:
"
. The reason for such rule is well stated in
the Dooling case, supra: 'As a matter of practical administration of municipal affairs this interpretation is
the only one which would render the referendum a
workable measure. If every dissatisfied bidder or disappointed applicant for municipal work could invoke
the machinery of the referendum of the statute, thereby suspending the taking effect of the measure thus
assailed, efficiency and economy in the business administration of a city would be seriously affected. This
consideration has led courts of some other jurisdictions to go far in restricting municipal referendum to
legislative acts.'
To hold otherwise would so seriously interfere with
municipal government and administration that we could
not espouse the view without explicit statutory pronouncement, despite the ~holdings or intimations of some
jurisdictions extending the referendum into actions of
an administrative character. . . ."
Since the Keigley case was decided in 1939, the Legislature has met 9 times, and apparently seen no reason to
amend the statute to change the Court's ruling.
If the proposed ordinance in the case at bar is administrative in its character, and we believe that it is, it does not
come ·within the purview of the initiative and referendum
law of this state and is not subject thereto, as was decided
by the Keigley case.
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POINT II
THE PRO·POSED ORDINANCE WOUlD HAVE PROVO CITIZENS ACT TO RAISE PR0'V0 POLICE AND
FIREMEN'S SALARIES AND SUCH ACTIO~N IS ADMINISTRATIVE IN ·CHARACTER, AND CONSEQUENTLY THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM LAW IS
NOT APPLlCABLE.

Although there is a division of judicial authority, we
assert with assurance, that measures involving the matter
of salary increases for municipal officers, including police
and firemen, are administrative in characte·r and the initiative and referendum law is not applicable. The situation
is well summed up in the annotation 122 A. L. R. 769 at
page 782 as follows:
"Logically, it would seem that as a general proposition ordinances dealing with the fixing of salaries of
municipal officers and employees other than those s~
cifically provided for by law are merely administrative in character as being subject to change depending
on length and quality of service, and other circumstances of fact, and therefore outside the operation of initiative and referendum proi\Tisions. However, the decided cases are in confusion on the subject, and it seems
impractical to atempt to reconcile them, or to make
any distinctions orther than those which may appear
in setting out the reasoning and conclusions of the court
in each case, and the particular statutory provisions
involved."
The following cases support the rule that ordinances
fixing the salaries of municipal officers are administrative
in character and therefore are not subject to the initiative
and referendum law:
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In Murphy vs. Gilman, 204 Iowa 58, 214 N. W. 679,
the Sioux City, Iowa, officials refused to pay increased firemen's wages required by an ordinance passed under the
initiative procedure. Mandamus was sought to compel them
to pay, and they contended that the subject matter of the
ordinance is not one within the purview of the initiative and
referendum statute, because (1) the fixing of salaries of
firemen is not required to be by ordinance; and (2) it is an
administrative act, and those statutes apply only to legislative acts of the city. The Iowa law provides that the right
of initiative and referendum shall apply only to an ordinance. The court further limited its exercise to ordinances
which were legislative in function. The court sustained
both the grounds upon which the city officials defended,
saying at pp. 681 and 682 N. W. Report:
"The establishment of a fire department is doubtless a legislative act, and such as is required to be by
ordinance. It is legislation of a permanent character.
But the fixing of the compensation to be paid its members is a matter of administrative exercise of power.
What is a proper compensation may depend upon many
changing conditions, which have to be met from time
to time, and may properly be provided for in a less permanent way than by ordinance."
"Our conclusion is that the fixing of the compensation of firemen was an exercise of the administrative
function of the city, and, in the absence of a statutory
requirement that it be done by ordinance, was not an
act to which the initiative and referendum applied, and
that the ordinance in question is therefore invalid."
In Holvey vs. Kapp, 355 Ill. 596, 189 N. E. 920, the
council of Springfield City refused to pass an ordinance in·
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creasing the salaries of firemen, or to submit it to the city
voters under the initiative proceding, and the citizens
brought this mandamus proceeding to compel them to do so.
The writ was granted by the lower court and the city officials appealed. The question presented on the appeal is:
Are the people of a municipality operating under the commission form of municipal government act empowered to
initiate an ordinance fixing the salaries of the city firemen?
The Illinois statute provides that any proposed ordinance
can be brought before the council and be submitted by it to
the electors under initiative procedure. Other sections of
the illinois law authorize the council to fix the compensation of all appointive officers or employees "by resolution
or otherwise," ·while all other officers, assistants, or employees, shall receive such compensation as the council shall
provide '~by ordinance." The court then goes on to review
and construe these and other sections of the statute, including those which classify the municipal operatives into various groups. The court also reviews Muvphy vs. Gilman,
supra, and follows it in this decision. In reversing the decision and denying the writ, the court had the following to
say at page 924 N. E. Report:
"As a resolution does not connote permanency, we
cannot escape the conclusion that the fixing of salaries
of the employees in the Springfield Fire Department
was an executive or administrative act and not legislative in character. It was therefore not a proper subject for regulation by the electorate, as it is quite generally held in this country that the power to initiate
legislation under statutes providing for the initiative
and referendum in the conduct of municipal affairs cannot extend to such functions of city government as are
purely administrative in character."
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"In other words, the legislature has allowed the
council to determine the form of its action. The form
of action taken, whether by ordinance, resolution, or
motion, is relatively unimportant. The subject of the
action, whether legislative or administrative in character, is all important and determines the applicability
of section 47 (section 312). If the subject is legislative, its ptwpose can only be accomplished by ordinance,
and the electorate, under section 47, is given power to
initiate it, but not otherwise."
In McElroy vs. Hartsfield, 185 Ga. 264, 194 S. E. 737,

the suit is to compel the ·city officials to pay plaintiff the
salary specified in an initiated ordinance fixing salaries for
firemen. The court held that the ordinance was invalid
for the reason that the initiative and referendum provisions
of the charter, under which the city was operating, were
not intended by the legislature to apply to fiscal matters
provided for in other sections of the charter whereby the
council and other officers were made responsible for appropriations in excess of income. To allow initiative or
referendum in such matters, stated the court, would place
it in the power of the electorate to disrupt and destroy the
system of fiscal management set up by the legislature for
the city, and by their acts force an excess of expenditures
over income, when the electorate were in no wise themselves
under any official responsibility.
In view of the fact that the state of Washington is one
of the states holding against our contention, it is quite natu-

ral that Payne vs. City of Spokane, 134 P2d 950, should remain in line with the Washington decisions. However, we
disagree with counsel in their brief when they conclude that
it is our position "that fixing of salaries might be legisla..
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tive in nature yet under the particular provisions of the
Provo ·City Charter it becomes an administrative function,"
and that the Payne case is a complete answer to this question. Our reading of the Payne case discloses that the proposed ordinance increasing the pay of members of the fire
department was held to be legislative and subject to the
initiative and referendum law, because the provisions of
that city charter made it so. These provisions are found in
the following quotations from the case setting forth the
provisions of the charter, at page 951 Pac. Reports:
". . . The clerk, as required by subd. (b) of
Section 82, Art. IX (providing for the initiative) of the
city charter, certified the sufficiency of the petition
and presented it to the city council. Subdivision (c)
of that section provides: '* * * the council, within
ten (10) days after the receipt thereof, except as otherwise provided in this charter, shall either pass such
ordinance without alteration, or submit it to a popular
vote at a special election which must be held within 30
days after the date of the ordering thereof. * * * '
. . . Art. IV, Section 2'6, of the charter, which provides: 'Employees, Compensation: The council shall
fix the compensation of all officers assistants and employees, and may change the same.' . . . Art. I,
Section 4, of the charter, which provides: 'Powers,
How Exercised: All power of the city, unless otherwise provided in this charter, shall be exercised by,
through and under the direction of five eommissioners,
who shall constitute the ·council and one of whom shall
be the mayor. The commissioners and council shall be
subject to the control and direction of the people at
all times, by the initiative referendum and recall, provided for in this charter.'"
It is submitted that there are no such provisions in the
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Provo City Charter and the Payne case is far removed from
applicability to the facts of the ·case at bar.
Counsel in their brief lay stress on two California cases
decided by the District Court of Appeals as being precedents
in support of their position. It is our contention that these
cases do not support counsel's claim. In Spencer vs. City of
Alhambra, 44 Cal. App. 2d 75, 111 P2d 910, the electors of
the City of Alhambra adopted an initiative ordinance establishing a scale of minimum salaries for members of the
city's police department. The legislative body, known as
the commission, of said city, refused to give effect to the
provisions of the ordinance, contending that the fixing of
minimum salaries for police officers was not subject to vote
by the people, and was beyond and in excess of the initiative powers of the electors under the terms of the city charter. Mandamus of the city commission to put the ordinance
into effect was sought and resisted by the city. From a
judgment directing issuance of the writ the city appealed.
The District Court of Appeals, Second District, Division 1,
California, affirmed the decision of the lower court. It
should be pointed out that this decision went the way it did,
not because the court held the salary ordinance to be legislative in character and not administrative, but because of
the provisions of the Alhambra City Charter, which follow,
at page 912 Pac. Report:
"Article XIII, Section 78, of the Alhambra city
charter reads: 'The commission, subject to the provisions of this charter, shall have power to organize
the police division and change the same and make all
necessary rules and regulations for its efficient administration, ordain penalties for violation thereof, establish the number of its members and the amount of their
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salaries, including that of the chief of police, and do all
other acts necessary to the efficient equipment and
operation of the police division of the city.'
"Article VII, Section 60, of the same charter contains the following language: 'The qualified electors
of the city shall have power through the initiative or
otherwise, as provided by this charter and the general
laws of the state, to enact appropriate legislation to
carry out and enforce any of the general powers of the
city or any of the specified powers of the commission.'''
Obviously, the court's decision was rested upon this basis
as appears from the following concluding language of the
court at page 913 Pac. Report:
"From the foregoing it is at once apparent that
the charter of the City of Alhambra has reserved to
the electors the broadest possible powers in the matter
of initiative legislation; powers so extensive as to permit adoption by the voters of any ordinance which the
commission might enact (Section 176, Art. XXIII), as
well as to carry out and enforce any of the general powers of the city or any of the specified powers of the
commission. The power to fix salaries of its policemen
is included both in the general powers of the city and
is reserved among the specified powers of the commission. Also, the ordinance here under consideration
qualifies as an act declaratory of a public purpose and
the ways and means of its accomplishment, thereby
bringing it within the purview of the legislative prerogative. The initiative ordinance in question is therefore
a valid exercise of the initiative powers vested in the
electorate of the city."
There are no such provisions touching upon the initiative powers of the city council appearing in the Provo City
Charter.
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Collins vs. City and County of San Francisco, 112 Cal.
App. 2d 719, 247 P2d 362, is another district court decision
cited by counsel in their brief in support of their position.
Here again the decision turned largely upon the specific
provisions of that ·city charter with respect to the use of
the initiative procedure in connection with fixing the salary
of municipal officers, which in this case were the policemen.
Counsel in their brief cite Mitchell vs. Walker, 295 P2d
90, as a decision of the Supreme Court of the State of California giving approval to the Alhambra and City of San
Francisco cases. The Mitchell case was a mandamus proceeding brought to compel the city council to submit to vote
of the electorate of the city, an initiative ordinance which
had been submitted to defendants and which they had refused to adopt. The District Court of Appeals held that the
effect of the proposed ordinance, requiring Monrovia city
council to increase or decrease salaries of policemen and
firemen in an amount equal to percentage of increase or
decrease applied to members of comparable rank of Los
Angeles County Sheriff's office and the Los Angeles County Fire Department, would be to delegate to the governing
body of another political subdivision of the state (board of
supervisors of Los Angeles County) power vested in the
council to fix the salaries in question, and held that therefore the ordinance was not one which could be adopted by
means of the initiative.
The decision in the Mitchell case is based upon the
delegation of powers point, but the court had the following
to say on the administrative ordinance not being subject to
initiative point, at page 92, Pac. Report:
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"There is some question as to whether or not in
exercising this power and performing this duty the
coun·cil acts in an administrative or executive capacity
rather than in a legislative one. In Spencer v. City of
Alhambra, supra, and in ·Collins vs. City and County
of San Francisco, supra, it is held that a City C'ouncil,
in fixing salaries of officers and employees, acts in a
legislative capacity. In both of these eases, however,
the court was considering action taken by the City
Council in adopting ordinances and fixing salaries under the provisions of the charters of the eities concerned, and it appears to have been unnecessary in view
of the charter provisions involved to decide whether or
not the fixing of salaries was a legislative matter rather
than an administrative one. On the other hand, in
Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal. 2d 125·, 222 P2d 225, the Supreme Court held that the supervisors of the County
of Los Angeles, in performing a duty placed upon them
by the legislature, were acting in an administrative
rather than a legislative capacity and in the porformance of that duty were not subject to control by the
electorate through the initiative."
Obviously, from the foregoing review of the Washington and California cases, it appears that these decisions
were made allowing the application of the initiative procedure to salary ordinances for municipal officers, largely because of the specific provisions of city charters involved.
POINT III
IN ANY EVENT, THE PROVISIO·NS O·F THE PROVO CITY CHARTER MAKE THE FIXING ·O·F SALARIES
FOR MUNICIPAL ~OFFICERS, IN·CLUDING P·OLICE
AND FIREMEN, ADMINISTRATIVE IN ·C·HARA,CTER
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AND SUCH ACTION IS NOT s·uBJECT TO THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM LAW.

We do not contend, as counsel claim in their brief, that
the fixing of salaries might be legislative in nature. Indeed, our contention is that such salary fixing ordinances
by the governing body are administrative in nature and not
subject to the initiative procedure, as held by Holvey vs.
Kapp, supra, and Murphy vs. Gilman, supra. We do contend, however, that all doubt about the character of such
municipal action has been resolved in favor of it being administrative in character by the adoption of the Provo City
Charter. On this question, charter provisions were controlling in the California and Washington cases above referred to. In the matter of invoking the initiative procedure the Provo Charter makes the Utah law in that connection applicable. The Utah law permits the use of initiative
and referendum procedures only as to measures which are
legislative in character. What action of the council is legislative in character and what is administrative in character
is to be determined from the provisions of the Provo Charter. To ascertain the intention of Provo citizens in this connection it is necessary to examine briefly the pertinent charter provisions.
Section 1-2 of the Charter vests all powers of the city,
limited only by the provisions of the State Constitution and
this charter, in the "council, which shall enact local legislation, adopt budgets, determine policies, and appoint the
city manager, who shall execute the laws and administer
the government of the city." These powers are to be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the Charter and if
the manner is not so prescribed then as prescribed by ordi-
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nance. The council is more particularly provided for in
Article 2 of the Charter and its powers there reiterated
(2-1). The ·Council appoints a city manager "who shall have
the powers and perform the duties as provided in this charter and by ordinance" (2-6). Section 2-7 empowers the
council to remove the manager and Section 2-8 restricts
the council from in any way interfering with personnel under the city manager in the administrative service of the
city.
Article 3 of the Charter sets up the city manager as
the chief administrative officer of the city, defines his qualifications, powers and duties, and provides that he shall appoint and remove city officers and employees, prepare the
budget and the annual report, advise the council on the
city's financial condition, "and perform such other duties
as may be prescribed by this charter or required of him
by the council, not inconsistent with this charter." Under
Section 3-5 the city manager appoints department heads, but
"may head one or more departments" himself.
The city budget is provided for in Article 4 of the Charter. The city manager is required to make the budget in
accordance with these provisions, provide for public hearings thereon and to submit same to the council for action.
After hearings, amendments, and adoption the budget becomes the strict measure of income and expenditures to be
made by the city during the fiscal year. Section 4-11 appropriates the budget items to the objects named from the
effective date.
Article 6 of the Charter creates the Department of Finance. The director is the city manager or his appointee.
His authority is the administration of the city financial
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affairs (6-4). He is required to control and make expenditures to insure that the budget appropriations are not exceeded (6-4 (3) ) . All officeTs and departments of the city
are prohibited from making expenditures exceeding amounts
appropriated by the Charter, and serious penalties for violations are attached (6-9) .
Article 7 of the Charter creates the Department of
Personnel, the pertinent sections of which are as follows:
"7-1. Appointments and promotions in the administrative service of the city shall be made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained, so far as
practicable, by competitive examination. To carry out
this purpose, there shall be a department of personnel,
the head of which shall be the personnel director, who
shall be appointed by the city manager; unless the
manager himself assumes the duties of the personnel
director.''
"7-2. The personnel director shall have power
and shall be required to: * * *
" (4) Prepare, install, and maintain a classification plan based on the duties, authority, and responsibility of positions in the city service;
'' (5)
service;

Prepare and maintain a pay plan in the city

'' (6) Establish and maintain a roster of all persons in the municipal service in which there shall be
set forth, as to each officer and employee, (a) the class
title of the position held, (b) salary or pay, (c) any
changes in class title, pay, or status, (d) such other
data as may be deemed desirable or useful to produce
significant facts pertaining to personnel administration; • • •"
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The council shall appoint a civil service commission, consisting of three members, and the manner of their appointment and their terms of office are set forth (7-3); their
qualifications and non-partisanship are stressed (7-4) ; their
compensation provided for (7-5); and powers and duties
enumerated (7-6) .
Section 7-7 ( 1) provides that the first director, as soon
as practicable after his appointment shall prepare and
recommend to the com~mission such rules as he may consider necessary, appropriate, or desirable to carry out the
provisions of Article 7. The manner of the adoption of such
rules and their subsequent amendment and enforcement
is provided for in this sub-section.
"(2) Rules adopted hereunder shall have the
force and effect of law. They shall proi\Tide for the
method of holding competitive examinations, the establishment, maintenance, consolidation, and cancellation of eligible lists, administration of the classification plan and the pay plan, the application of service
ratings, the hours of work, attendance regulation and
leaves of absence for employees in the classified service, the order and manner in which lay-offs shall ~be
effected, and similar matters of personnel administration·"
'
"(3) The powers herein ,conferred upon the director shall be subject only to the provisions of this
article and of the rules adopted hereunder, and may
·be exercised by regulation or by order as the director
sees fit.''

The civil service of the city shall be divided into the unclassified and the classified service and the positions included in each are set forth ( 7-8) . The director shall pre-
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pare an up-to-date record of the authority, duties, and responsibilities of each position in the classified service. A
classification plan grading all positions according to similarity of authority, duties and responsibilities shall be submitted by the director to the city manager· and by the city
manager to the council (7-9(1)). As promptly as practicable after the adoption of the classification plan the director shall allocate each position of the classified service
to the appropriate class therein on the basis of its authority, duties, and responsibilities (7-9(3)). Vacancies in higher positions shall be filled from lower classes, promotions
following competitive tests (7-10). The director, city
manager, and the council are each mandated to perform
the salary fixing functions contained in 7-11 as follows:
"The personnel director shall prepare for the city
manager a standard schedule of pay for each position
in the classified service. The City manager shall submit the pay plan to the council with such changes as
he deems desirable, and such plan shall take effect
when adopted by the council or on the thirtieth day
after it is submitted if prior thereto the council has
not disapproved it by resolution. The pay plan adopted by the council shall include a minimum and maximum and such intermediate rates as may be deemed
desirable for each class or position. Amendments to
the pay plan may be adopted by the council from time
to time upon recommendation of the city manager.
In increasing or decreasing items in the city budget,
the council shall not increase or decrease any individual salary items but shall act solely with respect
to classes of positions as established in the classification and pay plans. In no event shall the council reduce the salary of a class below the minimum or raise
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it above the maximwn salary established by the pay
plan except by amendment of the pay plan."
There is reserved to the police and fire department employees the state pension and retirement systems already
estaJblished by general law (7-12(1)) and (2). The civil
service commission is given the power to administer oaths
for the purpose of facilitating th~ administration of the
act (7-13) . Prohibitions against the commission are provided in dealing with the personnel of the city and penalties in case of violation (7-14).
By adopting this charter Provo citizens have created
constitutionally a home-rule charter city. The Charter,
in the words of Section 5 of Article XI of the Utah Constitution, has "become an organic law of such city, . .
and shall supercede . . . all laws affecting the organization and government of such city which are now in
conflict therewith.''
Under the Charter the powers of the city flow to it
directly from the Constitution. This Court, in Wadsworth
vs. Santaquin City, 83 U. 321, 28 P2d 161, in construing
this constitutional provision, expressed the concept as follows, at 168 Pac. Report:
"The power granted by the constitutional pro~
sion to ·chartered cities is no greater than that possessed by the Legislature and which it may, i.f it sees
fit, confer on unchartered ·municipalities by general
law. The difference is that, when a city adopts its
charter pursuant to the amendment, then the powers
which it may exercise are directly conferred iby the
Constitution, and may not be controlled by the Legislature, except as to those matters and things reserved
to the Legislature by the Constitution. . . ."
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See also: 2 McQuillin Municipal Corporations (3rd
Ed.) Sec. 9.03, p. 467, at pp. 468-9.
This organic law confers on and defines the powers
of the council and separates same into legislative and administrative functions. It specifically provides (1-2) that
such po·wers shall be exercised "in the manner prescribed
by the charter," or by ordinance if the manner is not so
prescribed. The Charter itself (7-11) places the power to
fix salaries of ·city employees in the classified service in the
personnel director, the civil service commission, and the
city manager. The provisions of this, as well as other sections of Article 7, clearly make the establishment of salaries an administrative matter. It is true that the council can adopt or disapprove the pay plan by resolution, but
the plan can also take effect without council action. Also,
on recommendation of the city manager the pay plan may
be amended by the council. The council is prohibited from
increasing or decreasing the budget items respecting salaries on any basis other than "classes of positions as established in the classification and pay plans." Also, the
council is enjoined from increasing or reducing salaries
above or below the maximum or minimum established by
the plan \Vithout an amendment in respect to which the
city manager has the power of recommendation.
Thus, by the charter organic law, the citizens of Provo
have themselves provided for the fixing of salaries of city
employees, and have specified the manner in which it is
to be done. Such action is to be carried out by the city
manager, personnel director, and council, whose functions
in that connection are clearly made administrative. Thus,
the said charter provisions respecting salary fixing are the
law made by the people of Provo by adopting the Charter.
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This is a legislative act. The carrying out of said provisions in establishing the salaries is left to the aforesaid officers and the council and the action in so doing is purely
administrative. In Keigley vs. Bench, supra, this Court
discussed the matter of a test which determines whether
or not particular action is legislative or administrative as
follows, pp. 761-762 A. L. R.:
". . . Numerous cases have laid down general
tests for the distinction between legislative and administrative ordinances.
. the general tests are
such as these:
'The crucial test for determining what is legislative and what is administrative is whether the ordinance is one making a new law, or one executing a law
already in existence.' Whitbeck v. Funk, (140 Or. 70,
12 P. 2d 1020).
'The general rule has been stated as follows: 'Acts
constituting a declaration of public purposes and making provisions of ways and means of accomplishment
may be generally classified as calling for the exercise
of legislative power.' 43 C. J. 585.' State v. Charles,
(136 Kan. 875, 18 P.2d 150).
'In determining whether the ordinance in question was legislative or administrative, we notice that
the authorities in the books are in accord that actions
which relate to subjects of a permanent or general
-character are considered to be legislative, while those
which are temporary in operation and effect are not.'
Monahan v. Funk, (1317 Or. 580, 3 P.2d 779) ."
From these tests which the Keigley case approves, the
said provisions of the Charter itself constitute the general
permanent law, while the means of carrying out that law
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by the officers of the city and the council are administrative.
A good case in point in this connection is Simpson vs.
Rite, supra, which was an original proceeding by Simpson against Rite, registrar of voters of Los Angeles for
a peremptory writ of mandate directing respondent to omit
from the ballot a proposed initiative ordinance providing
for repeal of resolutions of Los Angeles County board of
supervisors which designated, and pursuant to which the
county had acquired, a site for municipal and superior court
building and for designation of a different site. The Supreme Court held that the proposed initiative ordinance
dealt with adminisrative matters whi·ch, under state law,
were committed solely to the board of supervisors, and that,
therefore, the ordinance was not within the initiative function of the law. A peremptory writ of mandate was awarded. The board of county supervisors of Los Angeles County was required by the state law to select and establish a
site for superior and municipal courts. The phrase of the
state law was ''suitable quarters.'' The board had done this
in accordance with law and acquired a site and expended
large sums of money in the erection of the court building.
The initiated ordinance seeks to submit the matter of
where the site shall be to the people. The court had this
proposition before it for decision:
"Under the circumstances of this case, are these
matters within the reach of the initiative?"
It should be noted that this is a Supreme Court decision, whereas the others considered above are District Court
decisions, and the court holds that this matter was administrative and therefore not referable to the people by the
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initiative procedures. This holding is embodied in the following language at page 228, Pac. Report:
"It seems obvious beyond the reach of serious argument that the board of supervisors cannot perform
the duty of providing 'suitable quarters' for the courts
without selecting and designating the sites of the buildings to house the courts, as well as the character and
size of the building. -The determination of what is
'suitable' as quarters for the courts necessarily includes
the selection of a site as well as ascertainment of the
extent and character of accommodations which a building or buildings must contain. Prescribing the policy
and duty was the legislative act of the state; carrying
out the policy by performing the duty is an administrative function delegated by the state to the local governing body, the board of supervisors. 'The governing body of the (local political subdivision) * * * by
its resolution did not make a law but thereby acted in
an executive or administrative capacity as an instrumentality of the state to make operative the provisions
"
of a state law already existing.' (citing cases)
"Here the state has acted to establish the basic
policy and has vested the responsibility for carrying
out that policy in a hoard of supervisors. The steps
which the board has taken to carry out the state policy
-the determination that for 'suitaJble quarters' it was
necessary or expedient to erect new buildings rather
than to continue to use existing buildings, the fixing
of sites for the buildings to make them convenient for
the purpose to be served, the determination of the size
of the buildings, the arrangement of space therein to
provide court rooms, jury rooms, judges' chambers
and all the other details which enter into implementing the legislative act of the state-viewed as parts
of the entire project, are all inextricably woven and related. We are satisfied that, regardless of what might
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be the character of a particu1ar step in another context,
such steps appear here, in the respects in which they
are sought to be interrupted and repealed or controlled
by the initiative ordinance, to be predominantly and
controllingly administrative in character."

We believe that the Provo City Charter in Article 7
thereof, is the law made by the people of Provo on the matter of fixing salaries of city employees, and this is legislative. The ·manner and means of carrying out this legislative enactment by the said city officers and the council is
administrative. It is our position that the only way it can
be changed is by amendment of the charter in accordance
with Section 11-10 thereof, which re-enacts the constitutional provision to the same effect. It seems to us that the
reasoning in Simpson vs. Hite, supra, is conclusive of the
matter.
POINT IV
THE ATTEMPT MADE BY THE PROPOSED ORDINANCE TO RAISE THE SALARIES OF THE POLICE
AND FIREMEN OF PROVO CITY, WITHOUT FIRST
COMPLYING WITH ARTICLE 7 OF THE PROVO CITY
CHARTER, CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK
UPON THE CHARTER WHICH IS THE ORGANIC LAW
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PROVO CITY.
Attention is called to tlle fact that the proposed ordinance does not attempt to amend the Provo City Charter.
Petitioners have proceeded in that connection as though
the people of Provo had not adopted the Charter. However, they do invoke Section 7-10 of the Charter as authority for their procedure, 'but without first complying
with the terms of Article 7. Their action in so doing brings
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them squarely within the doctrine of the case of Dewey,
et al, vs. Doxey-Layton Realty Company, et al, (1954) 3
Utah 2d 1, 277 P2d 805. In that case the plaintiff sought
by initiative ordinance to re-zone certain property in the
east part of Salt Lake ·City. While the property in question was in Salt Lake County, it was zoned so that commercial development was permitted thereon. On its annexation to Salt Lake City the plaintiffs sought by petition with the city to re-zone the land Residential "A" and
after a public hearing in accordance with the statute this
was denied. Thereupon the plaintiffs circulated their initiative petition and filed it with the City Recorder. The defendants then sought a permit to build a service station,
which was granted by the city officials. The plaintiffs
sued for an injunction against the defendants building their
service station, pending the outcome of the plaintiffs' initiative proceeding ·and a judicial declaration that the defendants, if the decision was against them, would acquire no
property rights if they continued to build before the outcome of the initiative election was determined. On motion of the defendants the District Court dismissed the petition and this appeal was taken. Plaintiffs contended that
upon compliance with the provisions of the initiative and
referendum law they had a right to initiate their re-zoning
ordinance because it was legislative rather than administrative. To this contention this C'ourt answered, at page
3 Utah Report:
"However, a survey of the cases involving initiative and referendum petitions indicates that the line
drawn between administrative and legislative functions
is not the only limitation recognized by the courts as
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to the applicability of direct legislation to particular
ordinances."
The Court then concludes that initiative procedures
do not apply to re-zoning ordinances, using the following
language, at pp. 6-7 Utah Report:
"In the present case, the legislature has delegated

the power to zone to the legislative bodies of cities and
towns, so that the need for a comprehensive plan might
be met, and provided means for the protection of private property through notice and public hearings. U.
C. A. 1953, 10-9-1 ff. Thus, when appellants seek to
initiate re-zoning within the city without complying
with the zoning statute, they are, in effect, attacking
collaterally the very statute under which they claim
their power to zone. The validity of a zoning statute
may not be raised in a proceeding before the zoning
authorities because of their lack of authority to determine that question and because the applicant may not
attack the validity of the statute or ordinance under
which he is seeking relief."
"Appellants agree that the legislative body of the
city has broad discretionary powers with regard to
zoning of the city and that such body could not zone
without complying with the procedural due process
afforded by the statute. For the same reason, the
electors of the city cannot by-pass those provisions of
the statute as long as the zoning statute remains in
force. The state legislature has here acted within its
powers and unless the general law is affected by repeal or amendment by the legislature, or by referendum or initiative by the people of the state, the statute
guides the zoning process of the cities and directs the
means by which it is to be accomplished."

By the same token, the electors of the City of Provo
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cannot by-pass those provisions of the Provo City Charter adopted by them as long as the Charter provisions remain in force. Unless and until the charter provisions in
question have been changed by amendment in one of the
ways mentioned in Section 11-10 of the Charter, the provisions of Article 7 thereof will guide the salary fixing procedure of the ·municipal officers of Frovo City, including the
police and firemen.
CONCLUSION

Initiative procedures do not apply in Utah to measures
which are purely administrative in character. Although
there is a division of authority, the better reasoned cases
hold that municipal officers salary fixing ordinances are
administrative in character and therefore not subject to
initiative procedures. But it is quite universally held in
this connection that if the municipality concerned has adopted a home-rule charter, the provisions thereof will prevail
on the question of whether the salary ordinance is administrative or legislative.
Provo citizens have adopted a home-rule ·charter under
the Utah Constitution, and same has become the organic
law of municipal government in Provo. The Charter provisions have established the law with respect to the fixing
of salaries for the officers and employees of Provo. The
manner of caiTying out the law by the administrative officers and the ·council of the city are clearly defined. Because these charter provisions make salary fixing administrative action, the proposed ordinance cannot be submitted
to the electorate via the initiative law.
Furthermore, the proposed ordinance constitutes an
attempt to attack the provisions of the Charter collaterally,
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and to by-pass the salary fixing provisions thereof. Such
action cannot be legally taken short of amending the Charter.
We conclude that the initiative and referendum law
of Utah is inapplicable to the proposed ordinance. Werespectfully urge that this Court recall and discharge the
alternative writ heretofore issued herein, and to deny the
issuance of the peremptory writ sought.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE S. BALLIF
GEORGE E. BALLIF
Attorneys for Respondent
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